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The Exploding Toaster Analogy
The exploding toaster holds a special place in consumer 
protection lore. It is obviously an unsafe product: If they 
knew about the danger, consumers would not buy the 
toaster and regulators would pull it off store shelves.  
The exploding toaster analogy highlights the differences 
between consumer goods markets and the often more 
complicated market for financial services. Some believe 
that although consumers wouldn’t knowingly buy an  
exploding toaster, in the past few years millions of them 
took out an “exploding mortgage.” 
Granted, this is a simplified analogy. But it underlines the 
observation that ordinary consumer goods seem a lot safer  
than some financial products. How do consumer goods 
markets—and their regulators—differ from consumer 
finance markets?
Quite a bit, actually.
For some time, consumer finance regulation in this country  
has been guided by a couple of fundamental (and still true)  
economic principles: First, competition usually works  
in consumers’ favor. It lowers prices, raises quality, and 
gives people more choices. Second, information, often in 
the form of disclosures, helps consumers understand a 
product’s strengths and weaknesses. 
Both of those notions have been tested in the current 
financial crisis. Competition was intense, to judge by  
the sheer number of mortgage brokers and lenders. 
Unfortunately, competition did not always translate into 
high-quality, affordable products for consumers.  
How about disclosures? Anyone who has been to a 
mortgage signing ceremony has witnessed the lengthy 
Making Financial Markets Safer for Consumers:  
Lessons from Consumer Goods Markets and Beyond
In the wake of the mortgage meltdown, policy  makers are discussing how best to protect consumers in financial   
product markets. The Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland hosted a seminar, “Consumer Protection in Financial  
Product Markets,” in September 2009 to exchange ideas with other regulators about consumer protection and 
the role of the courts. Conference participants zeroed in on four areas of reform:
 ■ Increasing oversight of lightly regulated lenders
 ■   Ensuring that disclosure statements are rigorously tested for comprehensibility and effectiveness
 ■   Encouraging market interventions that make comparison shopping easier
 ■   Introducing new legal requirements that firms match buyers with the most suitable products
Some mainstay economic principles were suggested to guide reforms, such as supporting competition and 
consumer choice, and strengthening borrowers’ and lenders’ incentives to deal in safer products.
All quotations in this article come from discussions and panelists’ statements during the conference.
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dis closures involved in the borrowing process. But  
borrowers’ ability to fully digest and comprehend page 
after page of disclosures is doubtful.
It is time to step back and re-evaluate our approach to 
consumer protection in financial markets. To get started, 
we can examine how a consumer’s shopping experience 
could be affected by product regulation and pre-market 
approval; information and disclosures; and gatekeepers.
Product Regulation and Pre-Market Approval
In 1970, the National Commission on Product Safety 
reported to Congress on a two-year study of consumer 
goods safety. The findings were appalling: a total of 
30,000 deaths and 20 million injuries from common 
household products each year. Lawn mower blades 
chopped off hands and feet. Infants strangled when they 
wedged their heads between crib slats. Hair dryers, even 
when turned off, fell into bathtubs and electrocuted people.  
Most of these products were labeled clearly with easy-to-
understand warnings, but those labels proved disastrously 
inadequate. Today’s regulation of financial products is not 
much different. Regulators require disclosures, which we 
assume will protect consumers from harm.
“That was an indifferent marketplace. That was a market-
place where year in and year out, these things were happen-
ing, and unless you knew one of those people [the victims], 
you wouldn’t even know this happened,” said David Pittle, 
one of the original five members of the U.S. Consumer 
Product Safety Commission and former senior vice presi-
dent for technical policy at Consumers Union.
Today, by federal mandate, lawn mowers shut off within 
three seconds after the operator lets go of the handle, 
the spaces between crib slats are too narrow to trap an 
infant’s head, and hair dryers have a ground-fault circuit 
interrupter that prevents electrocutions. “Those changes 
don’t happen by themselves,” Pittle said. “It takes a federal 
presence to make that happen.”
The Consumer Product Safety Commission was formed 
in 1973. According to Pittle, this was an essential step in 
identifying safety issues and forcing corrective action. 
Before the commission was formed, consumer goods 
were regulated by a variety of agencies and some were 
completely unregulated. For financial products, the same 
situation still prevails.
The safety commission’s experience shows the power of  
information gathering. When data for a household product  
show clear patterns of injury and death, firms can respond 
—or can be compelled to do so. We have no comprehen-
sive data linking financial products to foreclosures, however.  
As a result, subprime loan abuses reported early in this 
decade could be dismissed as isolated incidents. 
In addition, products that pose serious potential danger 
to consumers must have regulatory approval before they 
go on the market. That is how it works with the processed 
food and pharmaceuticals overseen by the Food and Drug  
Administration (FDA), which has partial or full veto power  
over new product releases.  
Legal experts, academics, and government officials presented research, practitioner  
experiences, and the current state of the law at the Cleveland Fed’s September 11, 2009,  
seminar on consumer protection.
Top row: Mark Sniderman 
Fourth row, from left: Stephan Whitaker, Susan Wachter, Kathleen Engel 
Third row, from left: Janis Pappalardo, Patricia McCoy  
Second row, from left: David Pittle, Gregory Elliehausen, Dan Carpenter, Tom Fitzpatrick 
Bottom row, from left: Ray Brescia, Jerry Fons, John Lynch, Creola Johnson, Alan Levy
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Harvard political scientist Dan Carpenter argued that  
the FDA  has produced positive outcomes because it has 
focused on high-quality research, which has benefited 
food and pharmaceuticals consumers immensely. “In the 
FDA model for drugs—and I’m not saying it’s the right 
model for consumer finance—the veto power [to keep 
products off the market] induces this experimental  
incentive,” Carpenter said.  
After a product has FDA approval based on information 
rigorously acquired from randomized clinical trials, the 
product must have clear labeling that tells consumers 
what it has been approved for. “Institutions are needed as 
well as markets for the provision of that kind of informa-
tion,” Carpenter said. “I just don’t think markets [alone] 
are going to get you there.” 
 In the case of financial products, some firms already have 
databases to identify their own potential risks. The issue 
is whether a regulator can gather comprehensive data for 
consumer protection, or give firms an incentive to use 
those data internally to avoid harming consumers.
Standard economic theory would suggest that pre-market 
approval would decrease supply and eventually would 
hurt consumers by restricting choice. But several research 
papers on regulatory standards for food that were estab-
lished in the early 1900s reached the opposite conclusion: 
Consumption of processed food greatly expanded in 
states that adopted standards for regulating food quality.
The notion that regulation can actually spur innovation may  
also apply to the withdrawal of products from a market. 
For example, what happened in the early 1970s when  
the FDA removed mental health drugs that had bad side 
effects? Pharmaceutical companies conducted research that  
developed several new drugs, including antidepressants 
such as Prozac. “In large part, the sort of revolution in 
psychopharmacology has occurred because we got rid of 
the lemons in the marketplace,” Carpenter said.
Information and Disclosures
Let’s visit the supermarket. People shopping for low-fat  
yogurt usually don’t have the means to perform a nutri-
tional analysis, so the FDA requires the manufacturer to 
provide that information; it also regulates the manufac-
turers’ claims closely. Yogurt can’t be called low-fat unless 
it satisfies the FDA’s definition of the term. But even  
accurate information, clearly displayed on the carton, 
doesn’t guarantee that the consumer will make the decision 
that is best for him. Research shows that very few shoppers  
turn the yogurt carton around to read the ingredients list 
and nutritional information on the back. 
Many claims are made for financial products as well. Instead  
of reading a small label, consumers must read through 
stacks of disclosure statements to test those claims.
The danger with claims, according to Alan Levy, a senior 
scientist with the FDA, is that they can truncate the search  
for information. Consumers may get a product that only 
partly meets their needs, or they may miss out on a much  
better product. 
People read labels because they want to make good deci-
sions. “But their sense of what constitutes a good decision 
is quite different from a search for truth and the cost– 
benefit calculation that is often assumed to characterize  
their choices,” Levy said. “Too much of our policy attention  
is devoted to perfecting claim language, and not enough  
is devoted to getting consumers to ask better questions.”
If product labels aren’t enough, what else can be done? 
John Lynch, a University of Colorado psychologist who 
studies consumers’ decisionmaking, thinks that the most 
significant predictor of choice is whether the product is 
in the consumer’s “consideration set” in the first place. 
“For an option to be chosen, it has to be considered. It 
sounds obvious, but it’s profound,” Lynch said. “Most of 
the time when an option is not chosen, it’s not because it 
was examined and found wanting. Rather, it was not even 
considered.”
This brings us to the concept of nudging. Richard Thaler 
and Cass Sunstein wrote the book that made the term 
famous.  “A nudge is trying to help consumers make better 
decisions by changing the choice context subtly or by 
changing defaults that make the most likely mistakes less 
likely,” Lynch said. Nudges preserve choice but subtly  
direct people either to the choice that is best for them or 
to the most socially desirable choice. The authors have 
called it “libertarian paternalism.”
Nudging has shown some promising results. For example, 
it is becoming standard practice to make 401(k)s the 
default choice when employees sign up for benefits. That 
means that employees must opt out if they don’t want to The Mortgage Decision: How Nudging Might Work
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set up a company-sponsored retirement savings plan. The 
optimal decision—to participate—is the same however 
it is reached. But with opt-out nudging, more employees 
make the optimal choice because of the way it’s offered to 
them. Similarly, European countries with opt-out for organ 
donation programs have about 90 percent participation; 
only 20 percent participate in countries where donation  
is opt-in.
This is not to say that disclosures don’t matter at all. In a 
nudging regime, they matter a lot. The least safe products 
in a consideration set, for example, would have to carry 
detailed disclosures (see sidebar below).
Gatekeepers
Today’s financial instruments are so complicated that an 
expert gatekeeper is often needed to guide consumers 
through the selection process, much as doctors are the 
gatekeepers of prescription medications, and attorneys 
guide clients through complex legal proceedings. 
At the business level, credit rating organizations, such as 
Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s, are intended to serve as 
gatekeepers who evaluate companies’ creditworthiness 
so that people who buy and sell securities have accurate 
information. Government regulation makes these ratings 
the “keys” that open “gates” for investable assets. That is, 
receiving an investment-grade rating opens a world of 
investors that would otherwise be closed.
For consumers, mortgage brokers or loan officers are 
obvious candidates for the role of gatekeeper in home 
loan markets, said Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland 
economist Thomas Fitzpatrick. Many borrowers assume 
that their mortgage broker has their best interests in mind. 
“By one study, 40 percent of American adults believe that 
lenders are lawfully required to give them the best possible  
rates,” Fitzpatrick said. The fact is that no such law exists. 
Although brokers may not commit fraud and must abide 
by laws governing unfair or deceptive practices, they have 
no obligation to get their clients the best rate.
To overcome this problem, Fitzpatrick proposed applying 
“duty-of-care principles” to the mortgage broker business. 
Some jurisdictions impose such duties on brokers, but only  
in circumstances so specific that it is relatively easy to 
avoid liability.
A prospective homeowner logs on to a 
mortgage recommender website, which could 
be required, designed, and maintained by a 
regulator. 
 ■  The site asks questions about personal 
circumstances that affect the borrower’s 
relative level of risk for different loans. 
 ■  It inquires about the borrower’s preferences 
about the trade-offs between different loan 
features. 
 ■  Software searches a database with offerings 
from various providers and recommends 
five loans that regulators consider safe for 
the current borrower and that have the 
characteristics he prefers. The best fits—
which might even recommend an optimal 
down-payment level—head the list. 
 ■   A borrower is more likely to investigate 
at least some options if he is not faced with 
hundreds of loan products. Having too many 
choices can overwhelm people, causing 
them either to avoid purchasing anything 
or to pick a product without any serious 
investi  gation. (This phenomenon  has been 
observed with 401(k) plans: When companies 
offered hundreds of choices, employees 
dropped out of the program or chose what 
they considered “safest,” reducing their 
return on investment.)
 ■   Freedom of choice is maintained. Borrowers 
can ask to see loans further down the ranking,   
and even select a loan considered unsafe 
(off the recommended list), but experience 
in other contexts suggests that the vast 
majority will select one of the five suggested 
loans. As a rule, no loan can be originated 
without the borrower’s signature on a print-
out of his “recommended” list.
If the nudging system is optional or only  
available online, it may fail to reach less-  
sophisticated consumers, who need it the 
most. If automating the selection process 
proves too difficult, a broker who is obligated 
to select safe products could recommend five 
products or providers.
As University of Colorado psychologist John 
Lynch puts it, the recommender system is
“a form of a nudge 
that allows for  
the possibility that 
people in different 
circumstances could 
be affected by  
different risk levels 
for different kinds  
of loans.” In some  
ways, it resembles  
a supermarket for mortgage loans, which  
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Under duty-of-care principles, brokers could be held liable  
for selling faulty loans, much as investment advisers are 
liable for violating their fiduciary duty to clients. “A duty 
of care would allow a borrower to collect [damages] from 
a broker if that broker violated its duties,” Fitzpatrick said.
But broker liability may not be enough, he warned; it 
may also be necessary to add a step so that mortgage loan 
holders could not force a victim of unlawful origination 
practices to pay the full amount of the loan.  “The idea is 
that once secondary market purchasers are liable, they’re 
going to start paying more attention to the practices of 
originators,” Fitzpatrick said. 
As evidence, he cited a case from the consumer product 
market. In the 1970s, people could buy refrigerators by 
signing a promissory note. The retailer would sell the 
promissory note to a finance company, which would 
collect the buyer’s payments. If the refrig erator was defec-
tive, the consumer would still have to make payments to 
the finance company while trying to get compensation 
from the retailer that sold the faulty product. Consumer 
complaints mounted until the Federal Trade Commission 
assigned liability to finance companies. As a result, finance 
companies changed their contracts by inserting buy-back 
provisions, which could force the retailer to buy back the 
notes. The commission’s new rule was not reported to 
restrict credit or hurt small retailers.
Preserving consumers’ legal claims and defenses “forces 
the market to internalize those costs and re-price credit 
appropriately,” Fitzpatrick said. “By many accounts, it’s 
been effective in accomplishing its goals.”
The details are complex, of course. The roughly 8,000 
banks in the country are all closely supervised by state or 
federal regulators, and often by both. But there are many 
thousands more mortgage brokers than banks. How 
specific and flexible should the rules be as the market 
evolves? Will regulators merely supervise the market,  
or will violators be prosecuted? Will it be a federal effort?  
“If we leave it to the states alone, we end up with a patch-
work of laws that is somewhat more difficult for companies  
to comply with if they operate over state lines,” said Pat 
McCoy, a law professor at the University of Connecticut. 
On July 30, 2008, the Fed issued a rule regulating a broad 
spectrum of mortgages, which it may broaden further. As 
both Fitzpatrick and McCoy noted, some reformers argue 
that liability should be imposed not only on brokers and 
lenders but also on secondary market purchasers, such as 
the government-sponsored enterprises Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac. That liability would encourage lenders to 
suggest loans that the borrower has a good chance of  
repaying, and would encourage secondary market investors 
to deny funds to firms engaged in fraudulent practices.
A New, Reality-Based Approach
Gatekeeping, product regulation, and pre-market approval  
already exist in consumer finance—but to a smaller extent 
than in consumer goods.
The dangers from faulty consumer goods include death, 
injury, disease, and destruction of property. Financial 
dangers take the form of bankruptcy, foreclosure, and a 
diminished standard of living.  
The recent financial crisis has shown that disclosure-based  
regulation of mortgage products is inadequate. Given the 
comments of the conference participants, how might a new  
consumer protection regime affect the mortgage market?
  ■   It would track mortgage products by classification 
according to their risk to better identify dangerous 
products.
  ■   The concept of disclosure would change from giving 
consumers all of the details about one product to  
encouraging and enabling them to comparison shop. 
This might mean selecting a manageable number of 
important details and requiring consumers to consider 
a minimum number of products or providers before 
entering into a contract.
  ■   There is strong evidence that consumers greatly 
value convenience and avoid extensive search efforts. 
Establishing financial services “supermarkets,” perhaps 
structured as recommender systems, would help make 
the market more competitive and shopper-friendly.
  ■   Disclosures should be rigorously tested for effectiveness. 
In the realm of pre-market approval, firms should build 
and test products for safety before releasing them to the 
market.Competition benefits only those consumers who get  
honest information. Multipage disclosure forms do 
not help if they are too complicated for a non-expert 
to decipher, too long to read in one sitting, and too 
late to affect the key choices of house and lender. 
Even diligent shoppers have trouble breaking through 
the noise.
The Federal Trade Commission’s Janis Pappalardo and  
Jim Lacko noticed that in many deceptive lending 
cases, disclosure statements had been properly filled 
out, yet borrowers were still deceived. Their research 
showed that many borrowers “were unaware of,  
did not understand, or misunderstood key costs or  
features of their loans.” Did they have up-front 
points? An ARM? Prepayment penalties? Borrowers 
were often confused, and for good reason.
Disclosure Disorder
Many mortgage disclosure forms tell borrowers  
to check boxes that offer choices like “may have 
prepay  ment penalty” or “may not have prepayment 
penalty.” May? Which is it? “The thing that’s really 
shocking was that, in some respects, the disclosures 
were worse than ineffective,” Pappalardo said. 
“They actually seemed to create consumer misunder-
standings.”
More information is not the solution. Simplicity 
would be a step in the right direction, but what’s  
really needed is solid, objective, quantitative testing  
of disclosure forms. The results would help regulators  
take into account consumers’ preferences, differing 
educational backgrounds, and time constraints.
Papers and Presentations
Consumer Protection in Financial Product Markets, a Sept. 11, 2009  
conference. www.clevelandfed.org/research/Conferences/2009/
9_10-11-2009/index.cfm 
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  ■   Incentives for firms and gatekeepers should be aligned 
with the interests of consumers. The costs of providing 
unsafe products should be internalized: If a borrower is 
unlawfully led into a loan product—perhaps deceived 
or tricked with fraudulent promises—he should be 
able to use the loan originator’s unlawful conduct as 
a defense against paying on the loan, no matter who 
currently owns it. If loan purchasers were made liable 
for originators’ conduct in this way, purchasers would 
insure themselves against such losses and could spread 
the cost across all borrowers, instead of externalizing or 
passing it off on the wronged borrowers. 
To understand why consumer protection in financial 
product markets misfired during the mortgage meltdown, 
it is instructive to think about some of the factors that play 
into people’s decisions. 
First, people respond to incentives. Second, they differ from  
one another in their preferences, financial means, and time  
constraints and generally choose what seems best for them  
over the long term. 
Therein lies the challenge in consumer finance markets. 
Products like adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs) or payday  
loans are far more complicated to use than toasters. How 
do you structure incentives so that consumers make the 
choices that best suit their preferences, incomes, and time 
constraints?
For instance, many would consider an ARM with pre-
payment penalties the financial equivalent of an exploding 
toaster, but it’s not necessarily so. A borrower who is fully 
informed about his options—and the risks of each—
might still choose an ARM, and it might well be the best 
choice. For this borrower, the mortgage probably won’t 
explode.
That’s because credit helps people smooth their lifetime 
income. Janis Pappalardo, a Federal Trade Commission  
economist who looked into consumers’ different ways 
of making choices, came away convinced that we should 
not jump to conclusions when it comes to consumer 
behavior. “One person came in with an ARM—I think it 
was a piggy back [a second loan  used in place of a down 
payment]—and he knew exactly why he was doing it,” 
Pappalardo said. “He was in graduate school. His future 
income stream was going to be going up, so it was the 
right deal for him.”
That lesson is as important as any: Consumer protection 
can go too far. The trick is to find an equilibrium between 
helping people choose and making sure they are free to 
make the choices that are best for them.  ■ 